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INTRODUCTION 
Large part of the literature supports the concept that market investment is a key 
factor of the research performance. Coherently to this idea, quasi-market policies 
aimed at stimulating entrepreneurial behaviours of Higher Education institutions 
(HEIs) have been introduced in many European countries (Jongbloed, 2003), 
which nevertheless are often characterized by economic imbalances between the 
regions. In our paper we want to investigate factors affecting inequalities between 
HEIs performance because of their localization in more or less developed regions; 
for this aim we test the relationships existing between public policies, market 
investment and inequalities in HEIs performance, according to three hypotheses: 
1. Good scientific performance is related to the wealth of the economic context;   
2. Public policies aimed at reducing inequalities may rather increase them, as 
they do not intervene on the real causes of inequality; 
3. Market forces are correlated with inequalities: i.e. disciplines with higher share 
of private investment and more variance of private investment are those with 
stronger qualitative inequalities. 
Here we adopt a broad definition of market, which is not limited to the production 
and exchanges of goods, services and resources with firms, but covers also other 
non-governmental actors interacting with HEIs on a research contract base. Thus, 
market may include both private, public and semi-public institutions, firms and 
non-for-profit organizations. In this perspective, funding coming from the market 
is a proxy on the one hand of the attractiveness of the HEIs and of their capability 
to put in place entrepreneurial behaviours characterized by efficiency and 
effectiveness; on the other hand, it is a signal of the wealth of the economic 
context. Nevertheless, we are not interested to establish causal connections 
between market and institutional performance, rather we are interested to detect the 
correlation of the market and the academic performance with respect to 
government policies aimed at overcoming imbalances linked to the localization in 
less developed regions, suggesting that the former may be less important than the 
latter producing regional imbalances. 
As to institutional performance, we intend to focus on the capability of the HEIs to 
produce high quality scientific outputs, thus on their attitude to play a significant 
role as research universities in the national and international competition.  
We consider Italy as a case in which the geographical inequalities were particularly 
strong, impacting the amount of resources available for research activity (Reale, 
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1992), and they are still in place nowadays (Svimez, 2009; Reale, Pedron, Seeber, 
2008). Government attempted to reduce differences between the Italian regions, 
paying a special attention to the HE sector, but it did not succeed. Public policies in 
the ’80 and ’90 were aimed at strengthening the southern public sector of research, 
by creating new universities in the South; nevertheless, the results of the last 
National Three-Year Research Evaluation process (VTR) showed strong gaps in 
research performance between the Universities largely due to the location. 
The paper is organized as follow. The first and second paragraphs present 
respectively the theoretical and methodological framework. The paragraphs three 
to five test the hypotheses, and the last one presents concluding remarks.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Literature devoted much attention to the contribution of universities to 
entrepreneurship and to knowledge spill over from universities to business world. 
Less attention was paid to the inverse relationship, i.e. the impact of the context on 
academic performance. Two recent papers indirectly dealt with this subject. 
Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2005), analysed the conditions under which patents and 
publications generate the highest spill over and identified when the government 
should invest to strengthen academic research and patenting. The authors 
developed a non-parametric analysis on publications and patents of Italian regions 
and found that they generate positive externalities when patenting is very intense 
(size - effect). Publications in technical and engineering disciplines produce the 
strongest externalities. Regions with strong industrial background gain more 
benefit from the knowledge produced by universities; in this case the company 
investment in university is profitable (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2005). 
Dietz and Bozeman (2005) focused on contamination between universities and 
companies in the United States, and they identified factors increasing publications 
and patents.  Their analysis found that patenting and publications are influenced by 
the scientific environment, especially in the scientific and technical disciplines. 
Publications are negatively correlated to industrial funding and the most productive 
researchers are those spending the entire career in the academia. Patenting is 
positively associated to industry-university exchanges, to private funding for 
research and to the number of publications. Dietz and Bozeman concluded that 
stable career and public fund increase publishing, while mobility and private 
financing increase patenting. 
In some disciplines patenting and publishing mutually reinforce; Cohen showed 
that countries with highest scientific productivity are both the most active in 
patenting and those with the private sector most committed to R&D (Cohen, 1998). 
In sum, the context is likely to influence patenting, but the association with 
publishing is rather weak.  
In some cases companies may not find good partners in local universities and 
decide to cooperate with other universities. This behaviour was found by Hanel and 
St-Pierre by analysing companies in France, as the most important collaborations 
are with foreign universities, while collaborations with local research institutions 
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aim at filling technological gaps (Hanel and St - Pierre, 2006). According to Bhidè, 
the national innovation capability does not depend on upstream scientific research, 
rather on downstream and enterprise investment to import new knowledge from 
other countries (Bhidè, 2006). Both studies show that the utility of the universities 
to the local context lies primarily in responding to daily needs, rather than in 
providing new ideas and innovation.  
Scarce personnel exchange and lack of joint training programs of young 
researchers may indicate weak links between universities and local companies. 
These are common elements in Italy; few companies activate post-doctoral 
positions or fund industry-university doctoral courses (such as the CASE program - 
Cooperative Awards in Science and Engineering in the UK) (Feldman, 2007). 
The market as source of efficiency needs few adjustments when it is applied to 
HEIs, because of the non-profit nature of these institutions (Massy, 2004). 
Hansmann (1980) identified the legal and economic rationale that makes non-profit 
firm preferable to for profit firm in situation in which, because of asymmetries of 
information, the buyer is highly vulnerable to sellers' opportunism. As a result, 
nonprofits are frequently found in the markets for things like nursing homes, day 
care and education. Markets like these are sometimes referred to as "trust markets" 
because of that vulnerability. By reducing incentives for the opportunistic 
behaviour, nonprofits become the preferred suppliers in certain settings: they 
increase the probability that clients are getting what they are paying for (Winston 
1999). This is the case of the HE sector. Research activity and education outcomes 
may be esteemed as public goods: the private investment is under optimal because 
of the positive externalities they produce. Thus, various form of subsidy and public 
support are justified. Moreover, HEIs activity must not be oriented to satisfy only 
the market’s needs. On the contrary, HEIs’ activities should also focus on those 
niches that are usually neglected by the market. 
Other arguments can be outlined in order to highlight the specificities of the HEIs 
as organisations. 
Musselin (2007) points out that until few decades ago, the universities were 
depicted as organization with peculiar characteristics, which moreover followed 
national patterns. Though, since the 80s the specificity of the universities has been 
increasingly denied, new managerial tools have been introduced and they should 
have reduced the influence of the national models. There is a trend transforming  
universities into organizations but this evolution seems to have little impact on 
universities,  because two main specific characteristics of universities complicate 
change process. First, both teaching and research activity are functionally loosely 
coupled, they require low level of cooperation and coordination within HEIs 
(Weick 1976); second, teaching and research are rather unclear technologies, 
because they are complex processes difficult to grasp and there are ambiguous 
causal links between tasks and results. These specificities affect the efficiency of 
policies and tools used to reform universities, they must not be challenged rather 
they should be understood and used as lever for change.   
More recently, an analysis of the implementation of the New Public Management 
paradigm within the HEIs of different Western European countries shows that the 
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process toward modernisation and occurs with different rate and pace. Universities 
become more intense organisations, but not always stronger in terms of 
competitive and management capabilities. (Paradeise et al., 2009) 
The quoted literature suggests that the policies that aim at improving the 
contribution of the HEIs to the wealth of the economy and the society must take 
into account the specific features of these organisations. 
Dill and other colleagues (Dill et al., 2004) evidenced few characteristics of the 
policy framework that might facilitate markets in HE to contribute to the wealth of 
society. Among these, transparency and accountability, information on 
performance and quality of academic programs, measures for improving allocation 
efficiency are necessary rules to assure academic integrity. Policies can fail when 
their interference have the effects of impeding incentives for quality, efficiency, 
differentiation and innovation (Wolf, 1993). 
Jongbloed  (2004) points out that regulations addressed by the Government can be 
of two kinds: interventions aimed at stimulating market behaviour of the 
institutions, or interventions aimed at pursuing the equity of the system and the 
interest of the whole society by correcting the effects of the market on HEIs and 
diffusing the benefits of education and research produced by the Universities. The 
paper analyses the second set of Government policies, and specifically those aimed 
at setting up incentives and resources in order to counterbalance the weakness of 
income and wealth of the local economic context.  
Government policies can fail due to different reasons, for instance: the policy 
devices are not adapted to a receiver such as universities, unexpected and 
unintended effects emerge, policy costs of applying the regulation have been 
underestimated, because of combined effects coming from different regulations 
(Jongbloed, 2004). The paper develops tests to put into evidences that inequalities 
of HEIs localized in poor economic contexts are more correlated with Government 
policies than with the market behaviour; we do not aim at understanding the 
specific reason of policy failure. 
Moreover, we want to take into account the Putnam’s argument that the 
performance of the Region institution in Italy is better explained by the level of 
civic-ness of the citizens rather than by the wealth of the economic context 
(Putnam, 1993). The author founded that even high civic individual behaviour may 
be negatively affected by the social un-civic context; path dependency tends to 
reinforce the negative impact of the lack of civic traditions. This evidence suggests 
that the imbalances between regions may be increased rather than reduced by 
policies that increasing available resources but do not address the issue of the 
context where fund will be spent. 
 
The Italian case 
The rationale of the Italian Government interventions from the half 80s onward 
was to reduce existing gaps between the regions in terms of Higher Education 
personnel, number existing institution and resource allocation. These interventions 
have had mixed effects on the economically poorer regions. 
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On the one hand, between the half of the 80s and half of the 90s, the government 
supported the growth of the Higher Education system in the regions of traditionally 
low economic development by creating new universities, thus increasing the 
number of researchers and professors located in the South.  
On the other hand, in late 90s the government introduced a new mechanism for the 
allocation of core funding that was linked to the real costs and performance of the 
universities. This mechanism showed that southern universities were over funded 
compared to their productivity and resulted in a reallocation in favour of the other 
regions.  
Also the reform of Italian Basic Law (Constitutional L. 3/2001) is supposed to 
impact and rather enlarge the imbalances between rich regions, mainly located in 
the Centre-North, and poor regions, located in the South. The Law adopted the 
subsidiary principle as a rule for government, introducing a new relationship 
between State, regions and local government levels. Regions became fully 
responsible of the scientific research and have recently began to elaborate multi-
year research investment plans within the broad frame of the National Research 
Program (PNR). The plans aim at developing a regional research and innovation 
system that is supposed to facilitate the interaction between public and private 
companies, and take advantage of territorial proximity (spill over and network-
based capital). The investment in research will increasingly depend on the activism 
of the local political actors, but also on the local innovative players exploiting 
applications arising from research activity.  
Government intervention can be ideally divided in two phases. The first 
implemented from mid 80s until mid 90s was specifically referred to the 
Universities in the South, and it was aimed at setting up new public universities, 
with the hiring of new professors and researchers. These universities were 
generally small in size, generalist, but shared the same mission and objectives as 
well as they were recognized with the same status of the other universities in the 
country, and were granted by the same level of autonomy. The second phase went 
from 1998 until nowadays, it was direct to all the universities of the country and 
consisted in the  introduction of a mechanism – the quota di riequilibrio - for 
balancing the Government core funding allocation among the universities, 
according to their effectiveness in education.  In the same period of time, European 
Structural Funds have assured a substantial flux of financial resources to the 
regions Objective 1 and to the Universities located therein, for research, 
infrastructures, and training. 
In sum, the content of government policies for compensating inequalities linked to 
the geographical localization were in a first phase mainly based on the increase of 
the available resources and the rebalancing with respect to other universities in the 
country, rather than on the setting up of incentives and regulation aimed to promote 
virtuous behaviours of the HEIs. From mid 90s, universities in the South went 
under the same conditions and the same reform processes of other universities, and 
suffered the same drawbacks (Reale and Potì, 2009). Reforms tried to address the 
professional self-government from national - discipline to individual universities, 
in order to stimulate cooperation within each institution and inter institutional 
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competition. Universities became more important, for instance they were granted 
large autonomy in the recruitment process and they gain much administrative and 
expenditure freedom. Though, the implementation of the policy has been 
incomplete, given the lack of effective evaluation process, weak funding leverage, 
some limits to university autonomy which are supposed to assure the equity of the 
system were not removed (i.e. thresholds in the level of tuition fees and in the cost 
of personnel, central regulation of the status and the salaries of the professors, same 
legal value of the graduation degree for all the public universities), no adequate 
connection between powers and responsibilities of the management (Seeber, 2009, 
Reale, 2008). Thus, autonomy has been often misused: there have been many 
scandals and some universities now suffer severe financial problems. 
METHODOLOGY 
We test the three hypotheses on the relationship between market forces and 
academic performance by using indicators of research performance deriving from 
the national research evaluation process (VTR 2001-2003). VTR was promoted by 
the Ministry in early 2003 and developed by CIVR in 2004. Each university 
submitted one article for each four researchers, thus, considering co-authorships, 
about one third of researchers have seen judged at least one of their outputs. The 
aim of the VTR was to provide the Ministry information about the excellence of 
research produced by the institutions. The evaluation procedure was based on a 
blind peer review; each product was evaluated by two peers, and was rated either 
excellent (1), good (0,8), acceptable (0,6) or limited (0,2)i. The VTR peer review 
process has been positively accepted by academia and the evaluation process has 
been esteemed to be reliable (Reale et al., 2007; Schiantarelli, 2006).  
Some have disputed the capacity of VTR to represent the quality of the institutions, 
the main argument being that one publication every four researchers is not enough 
for taking into account also productivity of the institutions. Moreover, the analysis 
of institutional performance carried out by using ISI dataset shows positive though 
weak correlation with peer review, as productivity is taken into account by 
bibliometric methods (Aksnes and Taxt, 2004). Nevertheless, some main 
counterarguments may be mentioned. The well known Pareto principle states that 
roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes: also in research it can be 
reasonably argued that a significant share of the best publications contribute to the 
largest part of knowledge advancement. According to ISI data, Italian publications 
produced in 2001-2003 period were about one hundred thousands; around 17,3 
thousands scientific publications were submitted by HEIs and public research 
organisations, reasonably among the best onesii, and evaluated in the VTRiii. 
Moreover, no university received only excellent ratings for their products in no 
disciplineiv; and the share of products rated excellent was 30%. Thus, the VTR 
publications can be regarded a good sample for representing the performance of the 
institutions and to sufficiently cover the best scientific production. 
One of the main strengths of the VTR results is that they homogenously represent 
performance in all the disciplines, while ISI database has been often criticized 
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because it does not represent socio and humanistic disciplines as well as hard 
science: it only includes scientific articles while excluding monographic works and 
many important journals written in national languages (Figà Talamanca, 2000; 
Seglen, 1997). Last, but not least, VTR results provide qualitative evaluations 
across all disciplines while the mere count of ISI publications does not provide any 
qualitative differentiation and Impact Factor and Citation Indexes are 
approximation of the impact rather than quality (Weingart, 2005).  
 
The analysis makes use of synthetic indicator (UQy – “excellence indicator”), 
which represents the capability of a university to produce high quality outputs and 
with the majority of the authors affiliated to the university. This indicator built on 
the base of outputs rated as excellent was preferred to indicator based on the 
average rating because it better highlights difference of research quality among 
universities and the existence of research groups with scientific leadership.   
Box 1 - Indicator of the Quality of University y - UQy 
N
PRODxPEERx
UQ xy
)%/(%
14
1

  
xPEER% = University ownership of excellent products as share of the total 
ownership in discipline x. 
 The ownership is given by the ratio between the number of authors working in the 
university who submitted articles and the total number of authors. 
% PRODx= Products submitted by the University as share of the total products 
submitted in discipline x. 
N = Number of disciplines in which University y has a significant % PRODx : 
%PRODx>0.2% for each 500 university researchers (ex.: Univy 700 researchers => 
%PRODx>(700/500)*0.2=0.28%) 
GOOD SCIENTIFIC PERFORMANCE IS CORRELATED TO THE WEALTH OF THE 
ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
According to the first hypothesis, we expected that the scientific performance 
would be higher in rich economic context because of the larger amount of funding 
from the market. The capability to attract funding from the market is very different 
across disciplinary areas, thus, the existence of this link has been investigated by 
analysing two sets of disciplines. A group of disciplines that benefit most from the 
interaction with a rich economic context, because they can gain a much significant 
share of their total funding from industry and other companies, namely physics, 
biology, geology, agriculture, medicine, civil and industrial engineering. A second 
group that collects seven disciplines that do not receive a major share of funding 
from the market: mathematics, chemistry and socio – humanistic disciplines (see 
Table 5)v. From an economic point of view: North-West and North-East are the 
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richest parts of the country, Centre Italy is in a mid position while South and 
Islands are the less developed macro regions.  
Table 1 shows, for each macro region and group of disciplines, the number of 
disciplines in which performance is higher than the national average, and the 
average gap between regional performance and national performance.  
Given the previous assumption, we expect that the northern macro regions will 
perform better than the South, especially in the first group of disciplines. 
Performance is measured by the UQy indicator of excellence, calculated for the 
overall macro region. 
Table 1 –  Economic context and scientific performance: discipline sensitivity 
Group 1: more funds from 
economic context 
Group 2: less funds from economic 
context 
Macro 
Region 
Number of 
disciplines (out 
of 7) with 
performance 
better than the 
average 
Average 
performance 
gap (on a 0.2 – 
1 scale) 
Number of disciplines 
(out of 7) with 
performance better 
than the average (on a 
0.2 – 1 scale) 
Average 
performance 
gap (on a 0.2 – 
1 scale) 
North 6 + 0.23 7 +0.18 
Centre 4 -0.07 5 +0.08 
South 0 -0.27 0 -0.31 
Source: designed by the author on Civr-VTR data 
The result is counter-intuitive: the gap is very wide even in the disciplines where 
the influence of a rich economic context is weaker. We may than conclude that 
scientific excellence tends to be homogenously distributed over all the disciplines 
irrespectively to the market, and that there are no evidences that the economic 
context is the sole factor affecting imbalances in the institutional performance. This 
seems to confirm that the functioning of the institutions is correlated to factors 
beyond the local economic wealth, as pointed out by Putnam (1993). 
PUBLIC POLICIES AIMED AT REDUCING INEQUALITIES MAY RATHER 
INCREASE THEM 
For long time, southern universities were burdened by high teaching load and 
underweighted personnel compared to its population. Governmental policies have 
been oriented to fill the gap by increasing the number of universities. Between 
1990 and 1998 six out of ten new universities were established in the South (there 
are now 22 universities in the North, 12 in the Centre and 24 in South and Islands). 
This produced a large increase of research personnel in southern universities: 
between 1997 and 2009 research personnel in southern universities grew 36%, 
compared to 25% in the North and 22% in the Centre. Funding policy was rather 
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oriented to award efficiency and, indirectly, to rebalance expenditure for each full 
time researcher (Table 2). 
Table 2 – Italian public universities: variation in government lump sum allocation, the 
number of researchers and allocation/researcher per macro regionvi 
 
Thousands € of FFO per 
researcher 
 
FFO - government 
lump sum allocation 
∆ 97 - 08 
Full time research 
personnel    ∆ 
1997/8 - 2008/9 1998 2003 2009 
North 53% 25% 98 107 120 
Centre 31% 18% 107 107 119 
South 38% 36% 118 119 120 
Italy 42% 27% 
Source: designed by the author on MiUR data 
From 1989 onward, the autonomy principle has granted universities large 
autonomy in the recruitment policy. Recently established universities experienced 
a fast expansion, while growth was moderate in traditional universities. Thus, a 
good test of the policy success can be the comparison of the performance of recent 
and traditional universities, in the South and in the North. The public policy has 
been successful if recent universities in the South have a good performance and the 
gap with the North is reduced. On the contrary,  the creation of new universities in 
the South and the increase of personnel have further broadened the qualitative gap 
with northern universities. in terms of UQy indicator, recently established 
universities in the North have a performance of 1,13 compared to 0,53 of the 
southern (115% gap), while traditional universities in the North perform 1,16 
compared to 0,76 of traditional ones in the South (53% gap). The data are roughly 
the same considering  northern and southern universities with high growth rate of 
personnel (88% gap), and northern and southern universities with low growth rate 
of personnel (+42%). This means that the public policy did not succeed, because 
increasing the number of universities and researchers alone does not represent the 
solution. Which important factor was not considered by the policy? Can the lower 
performance of southern universities be explained by less public funding? Rather, 
table 2 illustrates that southern universities have received a larger amount of 
general public funding per full time researchers until recent years: only in 2008 the 
average allocation is similar all across Italian macro regions. So, also on the public 
side, funding is not the main point.  
We can identify three traps that may have affected the government policy: 
1 – Localism: personnel is recruited in the local context.  
2 – A fast growth exhausts the capital of excellent researchers. 
3 – Lack of meritocracy in the system delete any incentive to recruit the best 
researchers.  
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As to the first trap, the recruitment process of the Italian universities is heavily 
affected by the trend to hire people within the universityvii, which often were born 
and studied in the city were the institution is located; table 4 regroups a sample of 
Italian universities and points out the share of professors that was born in the same 
province of the university (column A - source: Perotti, 2008). A ‘localism 
coefficient’ is computed, by taking into consideration: the share of professors born 
in the Province were the university is located and the population of the provinceviii. 
Localism is higher in the South (0,54 average localism coefficient for southern 
universities of the sample) than in Centre (0,42) and North (0,33). 
Moreover, Italy is indeed characterized by high internal inequality in the skills of 
students. PISA survey (Oecd, 2006) shows great gap between science skills of the 
students in the North and the South of the country: for instance, Friuli has the same 
score of Canada, that is the second among OECD countries, while Sicily is just 
above the result of Turkey, the second worst. In table 4, to each university is 
assigned the PISA science result of the region in which it is located, for instance: 
Lecce and Bari have the value of Apulia (447). We use PISA results as a proxy of 
the quality of the human resources pool from which the universities may recruit 
research personnelix.  
Table 4 – Students science skills, localism and excellence indicator 
University-
location; 
N=North; 
C=Centre; 
S=South 
Excellence 
indicator of 
the 
universities 
in the region 
(scientific 
disciplines) 
Science 
competences 
OECD – PISA 
survey 2006 
Localism 
coefficient 
Torino (N) 1,423 508 0,38 
Milano (N) 1,421 499 0,29 
Padova (N) 1,398 524 0,26 
Firenze* (C) 1,355 513 0,47 
Bologna (N) 1,226 510 0,39 
Pisa* (C) 1,143 513 0,37 
Bari (S) 0,770 447 0,53 
Salerno (S) 0,968 442 0,35 
Napoli (S) 0,898 442 0,38 
Lecce (S) 0,728 447 0,48 
Catania (S) 0,635 433 0,64 
Palermo (S) 0,603 433 0,6 
Messina (S) 0,519 433 0,79 
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*PISA Oecd 2003 
Source: elaboration of the authors   
The Linear regression shows very robust results with both localism (P>|t| = 0.001) 
and skills of students (P>|t| = 0.000), strongly linked to performance of 
universities. Localism is linked to worse scientific performance (beta -0,39), while 
good students skills are strongly linked to good performance (beta 0,63). Thus, the 
bad performance of southern universities appears to be clearly explained by a 
negative mix of higher localism and worse educated human resources pool.   
The second trap states that a fast growth exhausts the capital of excellent 
researchers and it is based on the assumption that only a given share of students 
can be regarded as excellent. If recruitment rapidly accelerates, then the group of 
excellent students may be exhausted and universities may be compelled to hire less 
talented researchers. Moreover, literature suggests that the quality of the 
recruitment process has decreased in recent years (Bonaccorsi, 2007; Capano, 
2008), then universities with a recent expansion would have been more harmed. 
One datum seems to allow this hypothesis: the correlation between 1997-2003 
universities research personnel growth ratio and excellence indicator is -0,36. 
Nevertheless, the fact that recent northern universities are still able to gain good 
performance shows that the quality of human capital is the key issue, and that 
localism exacerbates the problem because universities do not look for excellent 
researchers outside the local context, for instance talented temporary researchers in 
slow growing universities.  
The lack of meritocracy is often regarded by literature has the main reason for the 
Italian HE problems; increasing resources for universities without introducing 
incentives for their correct use may rather increase clienteles and wastes. 
Gagliarducci et al. (2005) argue that extreme localism of Italian HEIs and their 
inability to attract foreign researchers are not due to a lack of financial resources, 
but rather on the lack of proper incentives, such as linking wages to research and 
teaching productivity. 
MARKET RELATIONSHIPS WITH INEQUALITIES 
In order to test the relationship between market and inequality in HEIs 
performance we can check whether disciplines with higher share of private 
investment and more variance of private investment are those with stronger 
qualitative inequalities. Table 5 shows the share of funding from the market for 
each discipline, the variance in institutions market funding distribution and the 
variance of institutions performancex. 
Variance coefficient = σ / X    
σ = standard deviation  
X=average value 
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Table 5 – Funding from the market and research performance variancexi. 
area 
Share of total 
funding from 
the market 
Market 
funding 
variance 
coefficient 
Performance 
variance 
coefficient 
01 - Mathematics and Informatics 21% 1,19 0,08 
02 - Physics 37% 1,35 0,07 
03 - Chemistry 28% 0,80 0,09 
04 - Earth Sciences (geology) 55% 1,06 0,07 
05 - Biology 38% 0,68 0,09 
06 - Medicine 48% 0,61 0,08 
07 - Agriculture and veterinary 54% 0,72 0,12 
08 - Civil engineering and architecture 47% 1,16 0,10 
09 - Industrial and informatics 
engineering 53% 1,37 0,04 
10 - Antiquities and humanities 21% 0,97 0,05 
11 - History, philosophy, psychology 21% 0,94 0,08 
12 - Law 15% 3,07 0,15 
13 - Economics and statistics 32% 1,26 0,28 
14 - Political Sciences 24% 0,92 0,15 
Source: elaboration of the authors 
The correlation between the share of funding from other subjects and performance 
variation is low and negative (-0,20); thus, there is not a relationship between a 
strong funding share from the market and inequalities. The analysis can be 
improved by considering the variance of funding distribution and performance 
variance, it can be supposed that larger market funding variance is correlated with 
larger performance variance, especially in those fields where market funding share 
is relevant. This hypothesis in not confirmed by the tests: in the group of 
disciplines with more impact of funding from the market (more than 37%) the 
correlation is even negative (-0,551): the stronger the funding are skewed, the more 
the performance are homogeneous.   
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paper analysed the relationship between the market and the imbalances of the 
HEIs performance in different Italian regions. Market is considered both as a 
source of income for universities and as a source of competitive advantages 
because of the richness of the economic context. We wanted to test if government 
policies aimed at pursuing the equity of the higher education system are more 
correlated to imbalances in the institutional performance than the market forces. 
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Despite universities are increasingly expected to behave like any other organisation 
and their specific nature is often denied, nevertheless the peculiar characteristics of 
its activities must be taken into account since they affect the way HEIs respond to 
market pressures and government interventions. Furthermore, the institutional 
features of the HEIs make them more able to act as non-for-profit organisations 
rather than as for-profit ones. Thus, they are devoted to invest in research themes 
and sectors, even if there are no optimal conditions and there is a high risk of 
failure, this attitude represents the justification for public core funding. 
Literature devoted to analyse the impact of the context on the academic 
performance showed that only under certain conditions (i.e. intense patenting 
activity) and for some disciplines (i.e. engineering) the context may influence the 
performance, but not always this influence produce good results in terms of 
research outputs or in terms of research collaborations.  
As to Government policies, failures or success are linked to different reasons, as an 
inadequate design or implementation, the overcoming unintended effects or the 
absence of some characteristics of the policy framework (transparency, 
accountability, measures for efficiency and effectiveness). 
In Italy, public policies for overcoming imbalances between the HEIs linked to 
their geographical localisation were mainly devoted to supply further resources (in 
terms of new universities and personnel), but no initiatives were set up in order to 
promote virtuous behaviour of the HEIs. 
First, we addressed the role of the market (rich economic context) in the 
universities in different scientific areas, using data on R&D investment and on 
academic performance. The relationship between private investment and regional 
performance is checked both at institutional and discipline level. The results do not 
confirm the hypothesis that the scientific performance would be higher in rich 
economic context because of the larger amount of funding from the market. Rather 
they show that good performances are homogeneously distributed across 
disciplinary areas, regardless to the market support. 
Second, we use data on the location, funding and age of universities in order to 
address the role of Government policies aimed at filling the regional gap mainly by 
setting up new universities and increasing research personnel in the South. Here we 
noted that the gaps between southern and northern universities seem to have been 
increased rather than reduced. Three traps may have affected the public policy, 
thus generating counterproductive results: i) recruitment have been harmed by 
localism, whose negative effects are particularly severe when combined with a 
context of poorly skilled human resource pool; ii) a fast growth exhausts the capital 
of excellent researchers; iii) the lack of meritocracy delete any incentive to recruit 
the best researchers.  
Third, we showed that the relationships between inequalities in research 
performance and market forces are not as strong as those with Government policies 
aimed to assure equity of the HE system. Our evidences do not allow to conclude 
on causal effects of the market or of the Government policies, nor let us argument 
about the reasons of policy failures. Nevertheless we think that these evidences 
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have a normative content, which allows for higher education the Putnam’s 
assumption about the importance of factors other than the market on the 
institutional performance. This implies that policies promoting equity devoted 
mainly to supply further resources instead of incentives and mechanisms aimed to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness might be more important creating imbalances 
than resolving them. 
NOTES 
i Excellent: the product is in the top 20% scale of the shared value scale of the international scientific 
community; Good: the products is in the 60-80% bracket; Acceptable: 40-60% bracket; Limited: bottom 
40%. 
iiSome argues that the outputs submitted for evaluation are not the best ones but the ones of the most 
prestigious and influencing researchers. Nevertheless, the selection of a poor product would have 
endangered the reputation of the powerful researcher; thus, the effect of academic power on the 
selection process must have been limited. The selection process of products was based on four steps: 
university researchers selected their best research products and submitted them to the department, 
selection at department level, selection at discipline level, final selection at university level. It is 
interesting to mention the experience of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, which in 2007 
commissioned a research evaluation process to an external committee based on a VTR like method. 
Each department selected the best products (in order to produce also a quantitative evaluation) and peer 
review was applied to a fixed number of these products: half selected by the department and half 
randomly drawn. The average quality of products selected by the department was significantly superior, 
thus supporting the overall quality and efficacy of the selection process.  
iii Dresch and Janson (1987) made similar assumptions on the distribution of talent across the 
population, the size of the scientific community and the exploited scientific production potential. The 
model was applied on United States scientific production between early ’40 and 1985. In early ’40 the 
scientific community was 0,33% of the population, the average talent was 170 IQ, thus the model 
presume that 31% of the potential scientific production has actually been exploited; in the seventies, the 
scientific community was grown up to 0,91% of the population, down at 158 average IQ and exploited 
53% of the potential; in 1985 the scientific community was 3% of the population, while talent was 142 
IQ and exploited scientific potential was 75%. 
ivWith some exceptions of rare cases where very few products were submitted, less then 9. 
v The relative weight of the market on total funding was esteemed to be a more meaningful indicator of 
intense links with industries, not for profit institutions, etc., than the absolute value of market funding. 
The groups of disciplines selected with the two alternative criteria almost coincide, with the exception 
of chemistry, which receives a high amount of funding from the market in absolute value. But, in 
chemistry, other public sources of funding overwhelm the market. Test developed with groups of 
disciplines selected according to absolute market funding generates quite the same results.   
vi FFO 1997 (source: Cnvsu doc 02/03; Miur Office of statistics) and research personnel 1997/1998 a.a. 
(source: Miur Office of statistics) 
vii Between 2000 and 2006, 93% of the new Full professors and 75% of the new Associate professors 
were already working in the university that recruits them (Seeber, 2009) 
viii  The formula for the localism coefficient is A/√B , where  A is the share of professors born in the 
province were the university is located and B is the population of the province. Population of the 
province is considered because, given two universities with the same percentage of professors born in 
the province where the university is located, localism is higher when the province is smaller. For 
instance, we can compare Lecce and Florence: they have similar share of professors born in the 
province, but the province of Florence has much more inhabitants.   
ix On the relationship between students education and research productivity see also De Marchi and 
Reale (1996)  
x For each discipline, the sample of public universities with more than 20etp researchers was considered 
(more than 15 for Political Science); we considered the average funding per researcher; the performance 
indicator was computed using the average rating of the submitted products.  
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xiSource: Vtr data; the data includes funding for research project, ‘market’ also includes a share for 
contracts and services.  
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